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Abstract
We consider an environment where potential buyers of an indi-
visible good have liquidity constraints, in that they cannot pay more
than their `budget' regardless of their valuation. A buyer's valuation
for the good as well as her budget are her private information. We
derive constrained-e±cient and revenue maximizing auctions for this
setting. In general, the optimal auction requires `pooling' both at the
top and in the middle despite the maintained assumption of a mono-
tone hazard rate. Further, the auctioneer will never ¯nd it desirable
to subsidize bidders with low budgets.
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11 Introduction
Auction theory revolves around the design and analysis of auctions when a
seller with goods for sale is confronted with buyers whose willingness to pay
he knows little about. A standard assumption in this literature has been to
con°ate a buyer's willingness to pay with her ability to pay- an unpalatable
assumption in a variety of situations.1 For instance, in government auctions
(privatization, license sales etc.), the sale price may well exceed a buyers'
liquid assets, and she may need to rely on an imperfect (i.e. costly) capi-
tal market to raise funds. These frictions limit her ability to pay, but not
her valuation (how much she would pay if she had the money). In some
sense, these ¯nancial constraints are more palpable than valuations, which
are relatively amorphous. There has been some applied and empirical work
suggesting that these considerations play a role both in the design of, and
bidder behavior in, real world auctions. However, there has been a small
amount of theoretical work investigating the (optimal) design of auctions
when bidders are liquidity constrained.2
In this paper, we are agnostic about the source of this liquidity constraint-
an interested reader should refer to Che and Gale [8] for a discussion on
possible sources of these constraints. Here we assume that there is a `hard
budget constraint', in the sense that no buyer can pay more than her budget
regardless of her valuation. Assumptions of a similar °avor have been made
in the monetary search literature, see for example, Galenianos and Kircher
[11] and the references therein. The key di®erence is that in their models
agents choose their monetary holdings a priori, whereas here they are given
exogenously.
We derive the revenue maximizing and constrained e±cient auctions in
this setting, when both valuations and budgets are bidders' private informa-
tion. We implicitly disallow mechanisms that require bidders to `prove' their
budgets by posting a bond equal to their budget up front.3
1Not every potential buyer of a David painting who values it at a million dollars has
access to a million dollars to make the bid.
2There has been more progress analyzing various `standard' auction formats when
bidders are ¯nancially constrained.
3This prevents bidders from overstating their budgets since they would not have the
2For a seller, budget constraints mean that low budget bidders cannot
put competitive pressure on high budget bidders. For this reason it has
been suggested the seller should subsidize some bidders to foster competi-
tion. We give three examples. In the FCC spectrum auctions, Ayres and
Cramton [3] argued that subsidizing women and minority bidders actually
increased revenues since it induced other bidders to bid more aggressively.4
In a procurement context, Rothkopf et al [22] ¯nd that subsidizing ine±cient
competitors can be desirable. Zheng [24] studies a stylized setting where
liquidity constrained bidders may be able to get additional funds from the
market at some cost. He considers a speci¯c auction format, and shows that
if the auctioneer in this setting has access to cheaper funds, he may wish to
subsidize some bidders.
A subsidy is not the only instrument for encouraging competition nor is
it necessarily the best. For this reason an analysis of the optimal auction
will be useful. It may suggest other instruments that are more e®ective. Our
main ¯nding is that if the seller were running an optimal auction, he would
never ¯nd it it bene¯cial to subsidize bidders. Rather he should favor budget
constrained bidders with a higher probability of winning.
Subsidizing bidders has two e®ects. The positive e®ect has been de-
scribed. However, to preserve incentive compatibility, one may be forced to
o®er a subsidy to other bidders, thus diluting the positive e®ect. Our analysis
shows that the negative e®ect dominates.
The technical contribution of this paper is to the literature on mechanism
design when agents' types are multidimensional. In general, mechanism de-
sign when agents' types are multidimensional is known to be hard (see for ex-
ample Rochet and Chon¶ e [20]). Solved cases, in the sense of mechanisms that
have simple descriptions, are rare. Intuitively, this is because when types are
multidimensional, there are `too many' incentive compatibility constraints.
Further, several of these papers use the structure of the problem they con-
sider to `reduce' the type of the agent to a single dimension, something we
are unable to do here. Armstrong [2], Wilson [23] and Manelli and Vincent
cash to post a larger bond. In practice however, posting a bond equal to one's budget
may be expensive, and regardless, our methods apply to this case as well.
4Their argument was based on the assumption that minority bidders would typically
assign lower valuations to the asset than large bidders.
3[17] are examples of the di±culties encountered in this class of problems, and
Rochet and Stole [21] survey solved cases. Malakhov and Vohra [16], use a
discrete types approach and the tools of linear programming to solve some
other cases (see Iyengar and Kumar [13] for the continuous version).
Budget constraints render the associated incentive compatibility con-
straints non-di®erentiable, despite the standard assumption of quasi-linear
utility. Therefore the Kuhn-Tucker-Karush ¯rst order conditions have no
bite in this setting. We skirt this di±culty by considering a model of discrete
types, i.e there are only a ¯nite (if large) number of possible valuations and
budgets.5 This makes the problem of optimal design amenable to the use of
tools from linear programming, which is less involved than its continuum of
types counterpart. In our opinion, the arguments used are signi¯cantly more
transparent, and the intuition cleaner and easier to grasp.
1.1 Related Literature
The literature on auctions with budget constraints can be divided into two
groups. The ¯rst analyzes the impact of budget constraints on standard
auction forms. Che and Gale [8] consider the revenue ranking of standard
auction formats (¯rst price, second price and all pay) under ¯nancial con-
straints. Benoit and Krishna [4] look into the e®ects of budget constraints in
multi-good auctions, and they compare sequential to simultaneous auctions.
Brusco and Lopomo [7] study strategic demand reduction in simultaneous
ascending auctions and show that ine±ciencies can emerge even if the proba-
bility of bidders having budget constraints is arbitrarily small. Several other
works too numerous to enumerate here study the e®ects of ¯nancial con-
straints in a variety of settings.
The second group considers the problem of designing an `optimal' auc-
tion. Maskin [18] proposed the `constrained e±cient' auction, i.e. the auction
that maximized e±ciency when bidders had common knowledge budget con-
straints. La®ont and Robert [14] proposed a revenue maximizing auction for
this setting, with the added restriction that all bidders had the same budget
constraint. Both of the aforementioned papers imposed Bayesian incentive
5Readers with long memories will recall that the `original' optimal auction paper by
Harris and Raviv [12] also assumed discrete types.
4compatibility. Malakhov and Vohra [15] design the dominant strategy rev-
enue maximizing auction when there are 2 bidders, only one of whom is
liquidity constrained. None of these papers considers the problem of design
when both budget and valuation are private information. Che and Gale
[9] compute the revenue maximizing pricing scheme when there is a single
buyer whose budget constraint and valuation are both his private informa-
tion.6 Borgs et al [6] study a multi-unit auction and design an auction that
maximizes worst case revenue when the number of bidders is large. Nisan
et al [10] show in a closely related setting that no dominant strategy in-
centive compatible auction can be Pareto-e±cient when bidders are budget
constrained.
1.2 Discussion of Main Results
In this section we describe the main qualitative features of the revenue max-
imizing auction subject to budget constraints.7 In particular, we draw a
contrast with the features of the classic optimal auction of Myerson [19].
First, some notation. Denote a generic type by t, and a pro¯le of types, one
for each agent, by tn. An auction must specify how the good is allotted at
each pro¯le tn, and each agent's payment at this pro¯le. Given this allotment
rule, let a(t) be an agent's interim probability of being allocated the good
when he reports type t.
When bidders are not budget constrained, the type of an agent is just her
valuation v, and Myerson [19] applies. Suppose Myerson's regularity condi-
tion on the distribution of valuations, the monotone hazard rate condition,
is met. In this case we know that at each realized pro¯le of types, the opti-
mal allocation rule allots to the highest valuation subject to it being above
a reserve v, where the reserve is the lowest type with a non-negative `virtual
valuation'. Assuming 2 bidders and valuations to be uniform in [0;1], the
resulting interim allocation probabilities are as graphed in Figure 1.
Now suppose all bidders have the same (common knowledge) budget con-
straint. The type of an agent is still just her valuation. La®ont and Robert
6Their de¯nition of a ¯nancial constraint is more general than ours, at the expense of
tractability.
7The constrained e±cient auction shares many of the same properties.
5Figure 1: Optimal Allocation Rule
showed that the revenue maximizing auction will `pool' some types at the
top. In other words, all types above some ¹ v will be treated as if they had
valuation exactly ¹ v, and the budget constraint will bind for precisely these
types. La®ont and Robert argued that the allocation rule will allot the good
to the highest valuation subject to this `pooling', and subject to it being
higher than an appropriately chosen reserve v. Further, this reserve will be
lower than the one in Myerson. The resulting interim allocation probabilities
are as graphed in Figure 2. The constrained e±cient auction according to
Maskin is similar except there is no reserve v.
A consequence of our analysis is that the claims of La®ont and Robert,
and Maskin are not quite correct.8 A condition on the distribution of valu-
ations in addition to the monotone hazard rate is needed. Speci¯cally, the
density function of valuations must be decreasing. If this condition fails, our
analysis shows that there can be pooling in the middle as displayed in Figure
3.
Finally, suppose bidders have one of 2 budgets bH > bL. Here, the type of
a bidder is 2 dimensional- his valuation, and his budget. As in La®ont and
Robert, there will be pooling at the top, however there will be two cuto®s,
8Appendix A provides counter-examples.
6Figure 2: Common Knowledge Common Budget, Decreasing Density
Figure 3: Optimal Allocation Rule: Pooling in the middle
7Figure 4: Optimal Allocation Rule
¹ vH ¸ ¹ vL, such that all high budget bidders with valuation at least ¹ vH will be
pooled and all low budget bidders with valuation at least ¹ vL will be pooled.
A bidder with valuation v < ¹ vL will get the same allocation whether he is of
a high budget or low budget type. Finally, the auction will require `ironing'
in the middle, around the cuto® ¹ vL. High budget bidders whose valuations
are slightly higher than ¹ vL will be treated as if they had a lower valuation.
The resulting interim allocation probabilities are graphed in Figure 4.9
The last of these properties merits attention. The worry with budget
constrained bidders is that bidders with `low' budgets are unable to com-
pete, e®ectively reducing competition in the auction, and thus revenue. This
property says that the optimal auction compensates for this by shading down
the valuations of high budget bidders. Surprisingly, this property is present
in the constrained e±cient auction, where it is clearly ine±cient.
The method of analysis yields another insight regarding the design of
auctions in such settings. Where prior work suggested there may be gains
to subsidizing low budget bidders (see Section 1.1 above) our analysis shows
that the auctioneer would decline to subsidize bidders if he was running
the optimal auction. Thus, arguments in favor of subsidies depend on the
9The constrained e±cient auction is structurally similar to the above auction, except
that there is no reserve price.
8analysis of speci¯c (i.e. sub-optimal) auction mechanisms.
1.3 Organization of this paper
In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3 we examine the special
case when all bidders have the same common knowledge budget constraint.
This helps build intuition for the more involved private information case. In
Section 4 we examine the case when bidders' budgets are private information.
In Section 5 we discuss the (im)-possibility of pro¯tably subsidizing bidders
as well as the implementation of this auction, and concludes.
2 A Discrete Formulation
There are N risk neutral bidders interested in a single indivisible good. Each
has a private valuation for the good v in V = f²;2²;:::;m²g. For notational
convenience we take ² = 1. Further, each bidder has a privately known budget
constraint b in B = fb1;b2;:::;bkg, wlog b1 < b2 < ::: < bk. The type of a
bidder is a 2-tuple consisting of his valuation and his budget t = (v;b); and
the space of types is T = V £ B. An agent of type t = (v;b) who is given
the good with probability a and asked to make a payment p derives utility:
u(a;pj(v;b)) =
½
va ¡ p if p · b;
¡1 if p > b:
In other words an agent has a standard quasi-linear utility up to his bud-
get constraint, but cannot pay more than his budget constraint under any
circumstances.
We assume that bidders' types are i.i.d. draws from a commonly known
distribution ¼ over T. We require that ¼ satisfy a generalization of the mono-
tone hazard rate condition. De¯ne fb(v) = ¼(vjb) > 0, i.e. the probability
a bidder has valuation v conditional on her budget being b. Further, de¯ne
Fb(v) =
Pv









9For notational simplicity only we assume that the valuation and budget com-










By the Revelation Principle, we con¯ne ourselves without loss of generality
to direct revelation mechanisms. The seller must specify an allocation rule
and a payment rule. The former determines how the good is to be allocated
as a function of the pro¯le of reported types and the latter the payments
each agent must make as a function of the reported types. We denote the
implied interim expected allocation and payment for a bidder of type t as
a(t) and p(t) respectively.
To ensure participation of all agents we require that:
8t 2 T; t = (v;b) : va(t) ¡ p(t) ¸ 0: (2)
The budget constraint and individual rationality require that no type's pay-
ments exceed their budget:
8t 2 T; t = (v;b) : p(t) · b: (3)
To ensure that agents truthfully report their types we require that Bayesian
incentive compatibility hold. However, due to the budget constraint, the
incentive constraints will only require that a type t = (v;b) has no incentive
to misreport as types t0 such that p(t0) · b. We can write this as:
8t;t




where Â is the characteristic function. Note that the presence of this
characteristic function renders the incentive compatibility constraints non-
di®erentiable, and thus the standard KTK ¯rst order conditions do not apply.
A key prior result we use in this paper is from Border [5]. Border provides
a set of linear inequalities that given the distribution over types, characterize
the space of feasible interim allocation probabilities. In other words, they
10It will be clear from the proofs that these assumptions are not necessary.
10characterize which interim allocation probabilities can be achieved by some
feasible allocation rule. These inequalities simplify our problem signi¯cantly,
since we now search over the (lower dimensional) space of interim allocation
probabilities, rather than concerning ourselves with the allocation rule pro¯le
by pro¯le. The Border inequalities state that a set of interim allocation
probabilities fa(t)gt2T is feasible if and only if the a(t)'s are non-negative:
8t 2 T : a(t) ¸ 0; (5)
and:
8T










The left hand side of (6) is the expected probability the good is allocated to
an agent with a type in T 0, which must be less than the probability that at
least one agent has a type in T 0.
















To orient the reader, we give an overview of the approach taken. First, by
using a discrete type space, we are able to formulate the problem of ¯nding
the revenue maximizing auction as a linear program. At a high level, it has
11the following form:
Z = maxcx
s.t. Cx · d
Ax · b
x ¸ 0
The ¯rst set of constraints, Cx · d, corresponding to (2 - 4), are `compli-
cated'. The second set, Ax · b, correspond to (6). We show that this set is
`easy' in the sense that A is an upper triangular matrix. Let
Z(¸) = maxcx + ¸(d ¡ Cx)
s.t. Ax · b
x ¸ 0
For each ¸ ¸ 0, Z(¸) is easy to compute because A is upper triangular. By




Thus our task reduces to identifying the non-negative ¸ that minimizes Z(¸).
Now, Z(¸) is a piecewise linear function of ¸ with a ¯nite number of break-
points. We ¯nd an indirect way to enumerate the breakpoints without ex-
plicitly listing them. In this way we compute the value Z.
In the auction context, the coe±cients of the x variables in the function
cx + ¸(d ¡ Ax) have an interpretation as `virtual values'.
3 The Common Knowledge Budget Case
In this section, we analyze the case where all bidders have the same, com-
monly known budget. This helps us build intuition and familiarity with the
proof methods used subsequently to analyze the general case. We examine
the case of revenue maximization.
Since all bidders have the same budget constraint b, a bidder's type is
12just her valuation. Further, we can drop the characteristic function in the IC
constraints since, by individual rationality, all types must have a payment of





s.t. p(v) · b 8v















a(v) ¸ 0 8v
First, add a `dummy' type 0 to the space of types, and de¯ne a(0) = p(0) = 0.
We can subsume the IR constraint, by requiring IC over the extended type
space V 0 = V
S
f0g. Standard arguments imply that an allocation rule a(¢)
can be part of an incentive compatible mechanism if and only if a(v) is non-
decreasing in v. Further, the payment rule that maximizes revenue associated
with this allocation rule is:
























0 µ V (9)
a(v) ¡ a(v + 1) · 0 8v
a(v) ¸ 0 8v
13where º(v) = v ¡
1¡F(v)
f(v) is type v's `virtual valuation', as in Myerson [19].
Monotonicity of the allocation rule makes many of the constraints in (9)
redundant.






1 ¡ F N(v ¡ 1)
N
(10)
Proof: See Appendix B. ¤
For convenience we set cv =
1¡FN(v¡1)
N .
The utility of the Border formulation follows from this simpli¯cation. The
constraint matrix in (10) is upper triangular, which makes determining the
structure of an optimal solution easy. In addition, a straightforward calcu-
lation shows that if a(t) is the e±cient allocation then all of the inequalities
in (10) bind.
By inspection, a(v + 1) > a(v) ) p(v + 1) > p(v); a(v + 1) = a(v) )
p(v + 1) = p(v). Therefore, if the budget constraint (8) binds for some
valuation ¹ v, it must bind for all valuations v > ¹ v. If the budget constraint
does not bind in the optimal solution, the solution must be the same as
Myerson's. Hence we assume the budget constraint binds in the optimal
solution. We summarize this in the following observation.
Observation 1 If a¤ is an optimal solution to (RevOptCK), the budget
constraint must bind for some types f¹ v; ¹ v + 1;:::;mg. Further,
a
¤(v) = a
¤(¹ v) 8v ¸ ¹ v:
Suppose the lowest type for which the budget constraint binds in the opti-
mal solution a¤ is ¹ v. Substituting into program (OPT); and dropping the
redundant Border constraints by Lemma 1, we conclude that a¤ must be a
14solution to problem (RevOptCK):
max
fa(v)gv2V














0) + (1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 1))a(¹ v) · cv 1 · v · ¹ v
a(v) ¡ a(v + 1) · 0 8v
a(v) ¸ 0 8v
Denote the dual variable for the budget constraint by ´, the dual variable for
the Border constraint corresponding to type v by ¯v and the dual variable










¹ v´ + (1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 1))
¹ v X
1




¯v0 + ¹v ¡ ¹v¡1 ¸ f(v)º(v) 8v · ¹ v ¡ 1 (a(v))
¯v;¹v ¸ 0
Let v be the lowest valuation for which a¤(v) > 0. Complementary slackness
11The primal variables associated with each dual constraint is displayed in brackets next
to the constraint.
15implies that:
¹ v´ + (1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 1))
¹ v X
1










1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 1)
= ¹ v ¡ ¹ v
´













: 8v · v · ¹ v ¡ 1
Intuitively, these equations tell us that the `correct' virtual valuation of a
type v is º(v) +
´
f(v), where º(v) is the Myersonian virtual valuation, and
´
f(v) corrects for the budget constraint: allocating to lower types reduces the
payment of the high types, and hence `relaxes' the budget constraint. As
in Myerson, we require that the adjusted virtual valuation º(v) +
´
f(v) be
increasing in v. A su±cient condition for this is that f(v) is decreasing and
satis¯es the monotone hazard rate condition. By analogy with Myerson, the
lowest type that will be allotted is the lowest type (v) whose adjusted virtual
valuation is non-negative. Finally, the optimal allocation rule will be e±cient
between types ¹ v ¡ 1 and v.
Proposition 1 Suppose f(v) is decreasing in v, and f(¢) satis¯es the mono-
tone hazard rate condition, i.e.
1¡F(v)
f(v) is decreasing in v. Then the solution
of (RevOptCK) can be described as follows: there will exist two cuto®s ¹ v and
v. No valuation less than v will be allotted. All types ¹ v and above will receive
the same interim allocation probability, and the budget constraint will bind
for exactly those types. The allocation rule will be e±cient between types ¹ v¡1







(1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 1))(1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 2))
¹ vf(¹ v ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 1))
:
If the su±cient conditions are not met, the optimal solution may require
pooling in the middle.
Proof: The proof proceeds by constructing dual variables that complement
the primal solution described in the statement of the proposition.
Since a¤(v) = 0 for v < v and f(v) > 0 for all v, the corresponding Border
constraints (9) do not bind at optimality. Therefore ¯v = 0 for all v < v.
Further 0 = a¤(v ¡ 1) < a¤(v) by de¯nition of v, and so, by complementary
slackness, ¹v¡1 = 0. Similarly, since ¹ v is the lowest type for which the budget
constraint binds, a¤(¹ v) > a¤(¹ v ¡ 1), implying that ¹¹ v¡1 = 0.
Subtracting the dual constraints corresponding to types ¹ v and ¹ v ¡ 1 and
using the fact that ¹v¡1 = 0, we have:12
¯¹ v +
¹¹ v¡2
f(¹ v ¡ 1)
= ¹ v ¡ ¹ v
´
1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 1)
¡ º(¹ v ¡ 1) ¡
´
f(¹ v ¡ 1)
(13)
Subtracting the dual constraints corresponding to v and v¡1, where v+1 ·

















¡º(v ¡ 1) ¡
´
f(v ¡ 1)








It su±ces to identify a non-negative solution to the system (13-15) such that
¯v = 0 for all v < v and ¹v¡1 = 0.
12This step is where the upper triangular constraint matrix is helpful.
17Consider the following solution.
¯¹ v = 0 (16)







v + 1 · v · ¹ v ¡ 1 (17)
¹v¡1 = 0 v + 1 · v · ¹ v ¡ 1 (18)
´ =
(1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 1))(1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 2))
¹ vf(¹ v ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ F(¹ v ¡ 1))
(19)
Direct computation veri¯es that the given solution satis¯es (13-15). In fact
it is the unique solution to (13-15) with all ¹'s equal to zero. All variables
are non-negative. In particular, ¯v for v + 1 · v · ¹ v ¡ 1 is positive. This is
because f(¢) satis¯es the monotone hazard rate and decreasing density con-






> 0. Furthermore, it com-
plements the primal solution described in the statement of the proposition.
This concludes the case where our regularity condition on the distribution of
types (monotone hazard rate, decreasing density) are met.







< 0 for some v. The dual solution identi¯ed above will be
infeasible since ¯v < 0. More generally, there can be no dual solution that
satis¯es (13-15) with all ¹v = 0. Hence, there must be at least one v between
v and ¹ v¡1 such that ¹v > 0. This implies, by complementary slackness, that
the corresponding primal constraint, a(v)¡a(v+1) · 0 binds at optimality,
implying pooling. ¤
In fact one can further restrict the set of optimal dual solutions.
Lemma 2 In any solution to the primal problem (OPT), at most one of the
Border constraint (9) corresponding to type v, and the monotonicity con-
straint corresponding to type v ¡ 1 can bind. Further, by complementary
slackness:
8v : ¯v¹v¡1 = 0 (20)
Proof: See Appendix B. ¤
The solution to the system of equations (13- 15), (20) constitutes the optimal
dual solution. It is easily seen that this solution is unique- therefore even in
18the case where ironing is required, there is a unique solution. Further the ¹'s
in the solution are the `ironing' multipliers a la Myerson.
We are also in a position to describe the constrained e±cient auction for
this setting. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1, and therefore
omitted.
Proposition 2 Suppose f(v) is decreasing in v. Then the constrained e±-
cient auction in this settin can be described as follows: there will exist a cuto®
¹ v. All types ¹ v and above will receive the same interim allocation probability,
and the budget constraint will bind for exactly those types. The allocation
rule will be e±cient for types below ¹ v ¡1. If the su±cient conditions are not
met, the optimal solution may require pooling in the middle.
4 The General Case
Recall the original program (RevOpt). We deal with the case where a bid-
der's valuation and budget are determined independently, and all budgets













s.t.va(v;b) ¡ p(v;b) ¸ 0
















The incentive compatibility constraints can be separated into 3 types:
191. Misreport of value only:
va(v;b) ¡ p(v;b) ¸ va(v
0;b) ¡ p(v
0;b): (21)
2. Misreport of budget only:




3. Misreport of both:







Standard arguments imply that the IC constraints corresponding to a mis-
report of value, (21), can be satis¯ed by some pricing rule if and only if
v ¸ v0 implies that a(v;b) ¸ a(v0;b). Incentive compatibility and individual
rationality imply





The di±culty stems from the IC constraints relating to misreport of budget,
(22) and (23). In particular, we need (further) constraints on the allocation
rule such that there exists an incentive compatible pricing rule. The follow-
ing lemmata identify the space of interim allocations such that each type's
payment is the maximum possible, i.e.





Lemma 3 For any budget b, individual rationality can be satis¯ed if and only
if:
p(v;b) = b ) a(v
0;b) = a(v;b) 8v
0 ¸ v: (25)
Proof: It is easy to see that for any v;b:
a(v + 1;b) ¸ a(v;b) ) p(v + 1;b) ¸ p(v;b):
20Further, by observation, (24) implies that:
a(v + 1;b) > a(v;b) ) p(v + 1;b) > p(v;b);
a(v + 1;b) = a(v;b) ) p(v + 1;b) = p(v;b):
Equation (25) follows. ¤
Lemma 4 Fix an allocation rule a such that a is incentive compatible and
individually rational with pricing rule (24). Fix two budgets b0 > b. Let vb be
the largest v such that p(vb;b0) · b. Then
a(v;b
0) = a(v;b) 8v · vb:
Further, a(vb + 1;b0) > a(m;b).
Proof: By assumption, p(v;b0) · b for any v · vb. By individual rational-
ity, p(v;b) · b for any v. Therefore the incentive compatibility constraints
(22) corresponding to type (v;b) misreporting as (v;b0) and type (v;b0) mis-
reporting as (v;b) for any v · vb imply that:
va(v;b) ¡ p(v;b) = va(v;b
0) ¡ p(v;b










0) 8v · vb
) a(v;b) = a(v;b
0) 8v · vb ¡ 1
To see that a(vb;b) = a(vb;b0), ¯rst consider the IC constraint corresponding
to type (vb + 1;b) misreporting as type (vb;b0). By assumption p(vb;b0) · b,
therefore we can drop the characteristic function and write the IC constraint
as:











) a(vb;b) ¸ a(vb;b
0):




1 a(v;b0). Similarly one
can show that a(vb;b) · a(vb;b0).
Finally, we need to show that a(vb + 1;b0) > a(m;b). By assumption,
p(vb + 1;b
0) > b ¸ p(m;b)
















> (vb + 1)a(m;b);
where the last inequality follows from the fact that for any v, a(v + 1;b) ¸
a(v;b). ¤
Lemma 3 shows that for each bi there is a cuto® ¹ vi 2 V , the lowest
valuation such that p(¹ vi;bi) = bi, and a(v;bi) = a(¹ vi;bi) for all v ¸ ¹ vi.
Lemma 4 shows that for each bi there exists a cuto® vi, the highest valuation
such that p(vi;bi+1) · bi; and that a(v;bi) = a(v;bi+1) for all v · vi. We
summarize this in the following de¯nition:
Definition 1 Given an allocation rule a that is incentive compatible and
individually rational with pricing rule (24), de¯ne cuto®s:
¹ vi = argminfv : p(v;bi) = big 8i · k;
vi = argmaxfv : p(v;bi+1) · big 8i · k ¡ 1:
Note that it must be the case that vi < ¹ vi+1.
Further, de¯ne :
¹ V = f¹ v1; ¹ v2;:::; ¹ vkg;
V = fv1;v2;:::vk¡1g:
Lemmas 3 and 4 imply:
22Figure 5
Observation 2 An allocation rule a : T ! [0;1] is consistent with cuto®s
¹ V = f¹ v1; ¹ v2;:::; ¹ vkg and V = fv1;v2;:::vk¡1g, where vi · ¹ vi+1 for all i, and
pricing rule (24), incentive compatible and individually rational if and only
if:
a(v;b) · a(v + 1;b) 8v;b (26)
a(¹ vi ¡ 1;bi) < a(¹ vi;bi) 8i (27)
p(¹ vi;bi) = bi 8i (28)
a(v;bi) = a(¹ vi;bi) 8i;8v ¸ ¹ vi (29)
a(v;bi) = a(v;bi+1) 8i;8v · vi (30)
p(vi + 1;bi + 1) > bi 8i (31)
a(vi + 1;bi + 1) > a(m;bi) 8i (32)
Figure 5 depicts an incentive compatible, individually rational allocation
rule for a type space with 10 possible valuations and 4 possible budgets.
23Given a collection of cut-o®s we describe how to ¯nd an allocation rule
consistent with those cuto®s that maximizes revenue. By Observation 2
we can drop the individual rationality, budget, and incentive compatibility










Subject to: (26-32), (5),(6).
To ensure a well de¯ned program the strict inequalities in (27) and (32)
have to be relaxed to a weak inequality. If for a given set of cuto®s, the
optimal solution to (REVOPT) binds at inequality (27) or (32), we know
that the set of cuto®s being considered cannot be feasible. Hence we can
restrict attention to cut-o®s where (the weak version of) the inequalities do
not bind at optimality.
Recall that by Border [5] we know:
Proposition 3 (Border) Let a : T ! [0;1] be the interim probability of
allocation for a type space T. For each ® 2 [0;1], set
E® = ft : a(t) ¸ ®g:










Therefore, having ¯xed the cuto®s V , by (26) and (32), most of the Border
constraints are rendered redundant. In particular consider type (v;bi); v · ¹ vi.






















: 8i;v · ¹ vi (34)
The next lemma further restricts the con¯gurations of cuto®s in a revenue
maximizing rule.
Lemma 5 Let a¤ solve (REVOPT). Then the cuto®s ¹ V ;V as de¯ned in Def-
inition 1 must satisfy:
vi ¸ ¹ vi ¡ 1; 8i · k ¡ 1:
A complete proof of Lemma 5 is in Appendix B.2. Here we give a sketch.
Suppose instead that in some pro¯t maximizing allocation rule a; for some
i, vi < ¹ vi¡1. We outline how to construct a rule a0 with cuto® v0
i = vi+1 that
achieves weakly more revenue. Since vi < ¹ vi¡1, a(vi+1;bi+1) > a(v;bi) for all
v. Consider decreasing a(vi+1;bi+1) by ± and increasing each a(v;bi);v ¸ ¹ vi
by ±0. If ±f(vi + 1) = ±0(1 ¡ F(vi)), we will maintain feasibility with respect
to the Border conditions. Pick ± such that a(vi + 1;bi) = a(vi + 1;bi+1) ¡ ±.
This modi¯ed allocation rule corresponds to the cuto® v0
i = vi + 1. The net
change in revenue is (¹ vi ¡ º(vi + 1))±
f(vi+1)
k , which is clearly non-negative.
However this simple procedure will violate the budget constraints. Appendix
B.2 shows that there exists a similar revenue increasing construction such
that the resulting rule is feasible in the optimization program (REVOPT).
With this added restriction on cuto®s; the set of incentive compatible and
individually rational rules are summarized in Observation 3. Since vi ¸ ¹ vi¡1,
(31) and (32) are satis¯ed automatically; vi ´ argminfv : a(v + 1;bi+1) >
a(¹ vi;bi)g.
Lemma 5 further implies that the budget constraint corresponding to
budget bi can bind in an optimal solution only if the budget constraints
corresponding to each bj < bi bind. Therefore, in any optimal solution, there
must be a largest budget bi such that the budget constraints corresponding
to b · bi bind, and the budget constraints corresponding to b > bi are slack.
25For notational simplicity we assume that in the optimal solution, all budget
constraints bind.
Observation 3 An allocation rule a : T ! [0;1], consistent with the cuto®s
¹ V = f¹ v1 · ¹ v2 · ::: · ¹ vkg and pricing rule (24) is incentive compatible and
individually rational if and only if there exist, x : V ! [0;1] and y : ¹ V ! [0;1]
such that:
a(v;bi) = y(¹ vi) 8i · k;v ¸ ¹ vi; (35)
a(v;bj) = x(v) 8i · k; ¹ vi¡1 · v · ¹ vi ¡ 1;j ¸ i; (36)
¹ viy(¹ vi) ¡
¹ vi¡1 X
1
x(v) = bi; 8i · k; (37)
x(v) · x(v + 1) 8v; (38)
x(¹ vi ¡ 1) < y(¹ vi) 8i · k; (39)
y(¹ vi) · x(¹ vi) 8i < k: (40)
Figure 6 displays an incentive compatible, individually rational allocation
rule whose cuto®s satisfy Lemma 5.




















(1 ¡ F(¹ vj ¡ 1)
k
y(¹ vj)
· cv 8i · k; ¹ vi¡1 + 1 · v · ¹ vi; (41)
k X
j=i+1











1 ¡ (1 ¡ k¡i
k (1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)))N
N
8i · k: (42)
26Figure 6
where the c's are the right hand side of the appropriate Border inequality
(34), i.e.
cv =
1 ¡ (1 ¡ k¡i
k (1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)) ¡ 1
k(1 ¡ F(v ¡ 1)))N
N
(¹ vi¡1 + 1) · v · ¹ vi:











i=1 ¹ vi(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))y(¹ vi)
k
(REVOPT2)
Subject to: (5), (37-42).
As before, we conjecture an optimal solution and verify optimality with
a suitably chosen dual solution. Hence we °ip to the dual and examine its
properties.
Let ´i be the dual variable associated with the budget constraint (37).
Since we assume constraint (39) does not bind at optimality, the correspond-
27ing dual variable will be 0, and therefore is dropped. Let ¹v be the dual
variable associated with the monotonicity constraint (38), and ¹ ¹¹ vi the dual
variable associated with the constraint (40). Denote by ¯v the dual variable

























¹ ¯¹ vj) ¸
k ¡ i + 1
k
f(v)º(v); (43)













¹ ¯¹ vj) ¸
k ¡ i
k
f(¹ vi)º(¹ vi); (44)
+¹¹ vi ¡ ¹ ¹¹ vi 8i · k
¹ vi´i +








¹ ¯¹ vj) ¸
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
k
¹ vi; (45)
+¹ ¹¹ vi 8i · k
´;¯;¹ ¸ 0;
Here, (43) is the dual inequality corresponding to primal variable x(v) where
(¹ vi¡1 + 1) · v · (¹ vi ¡ 1) , (44) the dual inequality corresponding to x(¹ vi)
and (45) the dual inequality corresponding to y(¹ vi). Fix an optimal primal
solution(x¤;y¤) and let v be the lowest valuation which gets allotted in that
solution. Therefore any type (v;b) where v ¸ v gets allotted. It is easy to see
that v · ¹ v1. Complementary slackness implies that the inequalities (43) bind








¹ ¯¹ vj) +
k(¹v ¡ ¹v¡1)













¹ ¯¹ vj) +
k(¹¹ vi ¡ ¹ ¹¹ vi)
(k ¡ i)f(¹ vi)












¹ ¯¹ vj) +
k¹ ¹¹ vi
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
= ¹ vi ¡
k¹ vi´i
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
(48)
Subtracting the equation (46) corresponding to v ¡1 from the equation cor-
responding to v for ¹ vi¡1 + 2 · v · ¹ vi ¡ 1, we have:
¯v+
k(¹v ¡ ¹v¡1)
(k ¡ i + 1)f(v)
¡
k(¹v¡1 ¡ ¹v¡2)














Subtracting the equation (47) corresponding to ¹ vi from equation (46) corre-
sponding to ¹ vi + 1, we have:
¯¹ vi+1+
k(¹¹ vi+1 ¡ ¹¹ vi)
(k ¡ i+)f(¹ vi + 1)
¡
k(¹¹ vi ¡ ¹ ¹¹ vi)
(k ¡ i)f(¹ vi)












Similarly, subtracting the equation (48) corresponding to ¹ vi from (47) corre-
sponding to ¹ vi we have:
¯¹ vi+
k(¹¹ vi ¡ ¹ ¹¹ vi)
(k ¡ i)f(¹ vi)
¡
k¹ ¹¹ vi
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))




(k ¡ i)f(¹ vi)
+
k¹ vi´i
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
(50)
Finally, subtracting (46) corresponding to ¹ vi ¡ 1 from (48) corresponding to
¹ vi, we have:
¹ ¯¹ vi+
k¹ ¹¹ vi
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
¡
k¹¹ vi¡2
(k ¡ i)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
= ¹ vi¡º(¹ vi¡1)¡
k¹ vi´i





(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
(51)
29If the optimal solution a¤ is strictly monotone, the inequalities (38-40) do
not bind. Complementary slackness implies all the ¹'s are 0. As in the
common knowledge budget case we set ¹ ¯¹ vi = 0 for all i since this will satisfy




(1 ¡ F(¹ vk ¡ 1))(1 ¡ F(¹ vk ¡ 2))





(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 2))
(k ¡ i + 1)¹ vif(¹ vi ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
¡
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
Pk
i+1 ´j
(k ¡ i + 1)¹ vif(¹ vi ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
It is easily veri¯ed that the ´'s as speci¯ed are non-negative and therefore
dual feasible. Further, one can show that i · j ) ´i ¸ ´j, in other words, as
one would suspect, smaller budgets have larger shadow prices. Substituting
into (49) we have, 8v : ¹ vi¡1 < v < ¹ vi,












Note that ¯v for all v such that ¹ vi¡1 < v < ¹ vi will be positive if f is decreasing.
Finally, substituting the ´'s into (50), we have:









(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
:
Observe that ¯¹ vi can be negative. The adjusted virtual value of valuation ¹ vi




(k¡i)f(¹ vi) which may be larger than the adjusted virtual valuation




(k¡i+1)f(¹ vi¡1) even if f is decreasing and satis¯es the monotone
hazard rate. This is because allocating to valuation ¹ vi ¡ 1 also `relaxes' the
budget constraint corresponding to bi (in addition to the budget constraints
for larger budgets), which allocating to ¹ vi does not.
In this instance, therefore, the allocation rule for the revenue maximizing
rule will require ironing. As described in the introduction, for each budget
bi there will be an additional cuto® vi. Types (v;b) where ¹ vi · v · vi and
b > bi will be pooled with the types (v;bi), v ¸ ¹ vi (i.e. the types for whom
the budget constraint binds). The allocation rule will be e±cient between vi
30and ¹ vi+1.
Finally, the lowest valuation to be allotted will be v0, which is the lowest
valuation whose adjusted virtual valuation is non-negative. To summarize:
Proposition 4 Suppose f(v) is decreasing in v, and
1¡F(v)
f(v) is increasing
in v. Then, there is an optimal solution a¤(v;b) to (RevOpt) that can be
described as follows: there will exist cuto®s ¹ v1 · v1 · ¹ v2 · :::vk¡1 · ¹ vk and
v0. No valuation less than v0 will be allotted. The allocation rule will satisfy
(35-40). The allocation will be e±cient between each vi and ¹ vi+1. Further,
for all b > bi and ¹ vi · v · vi, a¤(v;b) = y(¹ vi). If the su±cient conditions are
not met, the optimal solution may require additional pooling in the middle.
Proof: As before, our proof proceeds by constructing a dual solution that
complements the primal solution described in the statement of the proposi-
tion. Since a¤(v;b) = 0 for all v < v0, the corresponding Border constraints
must be slack, and therefore ¯v = 0 for all v < v0. Since x¤(vi + 1) > y¤(¹ vi),
¹v = 0.
The ¯v for vi + 2 · v · ¹ vi+1 ¡ 1 is as speci¯ed in (49), with the corre-
sponding ¹'s set to 0. By Lemma 2, ¯v for ¹ vi · v · vi is 0 since, by the
statement of the proposition, a¤(v;b) = y(¹ vi) for all b > bi. The relevant ¹'s
can be calculated from the relevant equations.
Instead of computing these ¹'s, we can instead suppose that the types
which have been ironed, f(v;bi) for v ¸ ¹ vig
S
f(v;bj) for j > i; ¹ vi · v · vig,




(F(vi) ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)) +
1
k
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)):
Further, its adjusted virtual valuation is:
º(ti) = ¹ vi ¡
(k ¡ i)(vi ¡ ¹ vi + 1)(1 ¡ F(vi))
k¼(ti)
+







Since the budget constraint for budget bi binds at ¹ vi, analogous to the proof
31of Proposition 1, ¹ ¯¹ vi is 0, and therefore we can solve for ´i from:




(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
= 0: (52)
Note that the adjusted virtual valuation of ¹ vi ¡ 1 can be written as:




(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
+
k´i
(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
:
To see that the ´i that solves (52) is positive, we need to show that:




(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
< ¹ vi ¡
(k ¡ i)(1 ¡ F(vi))
k¼(ti)
+
































j=i+1 ´j is appropriately small (see Proposition 6). Further,











¹ vi · v · vi, follows from the monotone hazard rate and decreasing density
conditions. (53) follows since the right hand side of (53) is a weighted average
of the right hand side of the latter two inequalities.
Further, we have that:




(k ¡ i)f(vi + 1)
¡ º(ti): (54)
To ensure that ¯vi+1 ¸ 0 it su±ces by inequality (52) that cuto®s ¹ vi and vi
32satisfy:




(k ¡ i)f(vi + 1)




(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
:










The partial solution identi¯ed above, with all other dual variables set to
0, is an optimal dual solution. Since ¯v > 0 for all vi + 1 · v · ¹ vi+1 ¡ 1,
by complementary slackness, the corresponding Border constraints (9) bind.
This concludes the case where our regularity condition on the distribution of
types (monotone hazard rate, decreasing density) are met. If the monotone
hazard rate or decreasing density assumptions are not satis¯ed then the dual
solution identi¯ed may be infeasible, and therefore additional pooling will be
required due to Lemma 2. ¤
We can also describe the constrained e±cient auction for this setting. The
proof is similar, and omitted.
Proposition 5 Suppose f(v) is decreasing in v. Then the solution of
(RevOpt) can be described as follows: there will exist cuto®s ¹ v1 · v1 ·
¹ v2 · :::vk¡1 · ¹ vk and v0 = 0. The allocation rule will satisfy (35-40).The
allocation will be e±cient between each vi and ¹ vi+1. Further, for all b > bi
and ¹ vi · v · vi, a(v;b) = y(¹ vi). If the su±cient conditions are not met, the
optimal solution may require additional pooling in the middle.
5 Subsidies
Since budget constrained bidders are unable to e®ectively compete in the
auction, this will depress auction revenues. To get around this problem, prior
work has examined various kinds of subsidies (lump sum transfer, discounts)
and their e®ect in a particular auction setting.
33In our setting, there is only one possible (incentive compatible) means
of subsidy- a lump sum transfer from the auctioneer to the agents. This is
because, given an allocation rule, incentive compatibility determines prices
up to a constant:





Let us consider a subsidy via lump sum payment of some amount ². This
costs the auctioneer ² per agent. The e®ect of this subsidy is to relax the
budget constraints by ². Therefore the gain in revenue is (at most) ²
P
i ´i.13
We show below that
P
i ´i · 1 , and thus ²
P
i ´i · ². As a result, if the
auctioneer were running the optimal auction, he should not o®er subsidies.
This result remains true even when bidders' budgets are common knowledge.




(k ¡ i + 1)
k
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)): (55)




(1 ¡ F(¹ vk ¡ 1))(1 ¡ F(¹ vk ¡ 2))
¹ vkf(¹ vk ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ F(¹ vk ¡ 1))
=
(1 ¡ F(¹ vk ¡ 1))
k
(1 ¡ F(¹ vk ¡ 2))
(¹ vk ¡ 1)f(¹ vk ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ F(¹ vk ¡ 2))
·
(1 ¡ F(¹ vk ¡ 1))
k
:






(1 ¡ F(¹ vi+1 ¡ 1)):
Therefore we are left to show (55).
13Recall that ´i is the shadow price of the budget constraint.
34Recall from the proof of Proposition 4 that at optimality, ´i, the dual
variable corresponding to the budget constraint corresponding to bi, solves




(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
= 0;
where
º(ti) = ¹ vi ¡


















(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)) +
k ¡ 1
k
(F(vi) ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)):
By the induction hypothesis,












(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
)
1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 2)








(k ¡ i + 1)f(¹ vi ¡ 1)
:
Rearranging terms, we have
k ¡ i + 1
k















(1 ¡ F(vi)) =
k ¡ i + 1
k
¡
1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)
¢
¡ ¼(ti): (57)





k ¡ i + 1
k










k ¹ vif(¹ vi ¡ 1) + ¼(ti)
´ Á(¹ vi;¼(ti)):
Observation 4 in Appendix B shows that Á(¢) is decreasing in its second
argument. Given ¹ vi, the lowest possible value for ¼(ti) is 1
k(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)),
at which the left hand side of the bound will be maximized. Therefore,
substituting ¼(ti) = 1




k ¡ i + 1
k
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 2))(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1)) + (k ¡ i)¹ vif(¹ vi ¡ 1)(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
(k ¡ i + 1)¹ vif(¹ vi ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
·
k ¡ i + 1
k
(1 ¡ F(¹ vi ¡ 1))
¤
How then does the optimal auction encourage competition? Recall that
for each i, types f(v;bi) for v ¸ ¹ vig
S
f(v;bj) for j > i; ¹ vi · v · vig are
pooled. The pooling serves to allot the good to disadvantaged bidder types
(v;bi), v ¸ ¹ vi even in pro¯les where there are bidders with higher valuations
and budgets present. Intuitively, favoring bidders in this way is better than
lump-sum transfers because there are more degrees of freedom: a lump-sum
transfer must be given to a bidder regardless of his type in order to maintain
incentive compatibility.
Further, it should be clear that the revenue achieved by the optimal
auction cannot be matched by a simple auction with subsidies provided via
lump sum transfers and discounts studied in the literature. The optimal
auction can be implemented as an all pay auction with a modi¯ed rule to
select the winner. In a standard all pay auction, the highest bidder wins the
good, subject to this bid being larger than the reserve price. Here, there will
be thresholds, i.e. the highest bidder may need to out-bid the next highest
bidder by a margin in order to win the good outright. In the event that she
36does not, the auctioneer selects the winner randomly.
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A Counterexamples
A.1 Laffont and Robert's Solution
In this section, we examine the classical formulation, with a continuum of
types. We show by counterexample that the La®ont and Robert solution is
not optimal for all distributions that meet the monotone hazard rate condi-
tion.
Suppose that, as in the original La®ont and Robert paper (herein LR), we
have valuations belonging to the continuum, say interval [0;1]; distributed
with density f(v), F(v) =
R v
0 f(v)dv. Their virtual valuation is de¯ned as
º(v) = v ¡
1¡F(v)
f(v) .
Further, suppose we have (as per their solution) 2 cuto®s, v1,v2. The
allocation rule does not allot types below v1; and pools all types above v2.






N(1¡F(v2)) v ¸ v2
F N¡1(v) v 2 [v1;v2]
0 o:w:
(58)





a(v)dv = b: (59)
Choose v1 and v2 to solve:
max
v1;v2








14If not, the solution of the overall program would be the same as Myerson's solution
[19].
39The ¯rst order conditions for optimality imply
f(v1)º(v1) +
(1 ¡ F(v2))2
(1 ¡ F(v2)) + v2f(v2)
= 0: (60)
Therefore v1 and v2 are the solutions to (60) and the budget equation (59).
Further note that this is the L-R solution. We are now in a position to state
without proof the `correct' version of La®ont-Robert's theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose the distribution on types is such that the density is
decreasing. Further, suppose that the monotone hazard rate condition is met.
The allocation described by (58), where v1;v2 jointly satisfy (59) and (60),
and the associated pricing rule




constitute the expected revenue maximizing mechanism.
A proof of this theorem requires taking the dual of an in¯nite dimensional
linear program (see for example Anderson and Nash [1]), and de¯ning the
appropriate measure on the dual space. We can now use the intuition gleaned
from Section 3 to identify a °aw in the L-R solution in the event that densities
are not decreasing. Pick a v3 2 (v1;v2); and `iron' some small interval of types




> > > <
> > > :
1¡FN(v2)
N(1¡F(v2)) v ¸ v2
FN(v3+²)¡FN(v3)
N(F(v3+²)¡F(v3)) v 2 [v3;v3 + ²]





By Lemma 6 (see Appendix A.3), if f(v) is increasing in the interval; then
g² ´ ²
F N(v3 + ²) ¡ F N(v3)






Let us assume that f(v) is increasing in the range [0;1]. As a result, the
40budget constraint is now slack. We can now potentially improve on the
revenue by `un-pooling' v2 to v2 + ±.
First, ± solves the implicit equation:
±
F N(v2 + ²) ¡ F N(v2)





N¡1(v)dv = g²: (62)






F N(v3 + ²) ¡ F N(v3)











F N(v2 + ±) ¡ F N(v2)





Therefore the total change in revenue is:
¢ = ¢(v3;²) + ¢(v2;²)
Since º(¢) and f(¢) are both increasing; ¢(v2;²) ¸ 0 ¸ ¢(v3;²). Potentially,
¢ ¸ 0 for some suitable parameter choices. In other words, our perturbation
of the L-R solution can increase expected revenue, therefore the L-R solution
is not optimal. We °esh out a numerical example below.
A.1.1 An Example
There are 2 bidders, i.e. N = 2. Both have valuations in the interval
[0;1] which are drawn i.i.d. with density f(v) = 2v; F(v) = v2. Both
have a common budget constraint b = 0:5. The `virtual value' of a bidder
of valuation v, º(v) = 3v2¡1
2v , which is increasing on the interval [0;1]. If
there was no budget constraint, the optimal auction would be a second price
auction with reserve price v0 = 1 p
3, i.e. º(v0) = 0.
Recall that the L-R solution would require us to compute v1 and v2 which




















Solving, we get v1 = 0:5415 and v2 = :7523. Therefore; v1 < v0 < v2. For
the perturbation we outlined above, select v3 = 1 p
3(= v0); and ² = 10¡4.































where the ¯nal inequality follows from the fact that v2 > v3.
A.2 Maskin
Recall that Maskin [18] considered the same environment as La®ont and
Robert, the only di®erence being he was interested in specifying the con-
strained e±cient auction for this setting. Analogous to our analysis for Laf-
font and Robert, we can state the correct version of Maskin's main theorem:
Theorem 2 Suppose the distribution on types is such that the density is
42decreasing. The allocation described by (58), where v1 = 0 and v2 satis¯es
(59), and the associated pricing rule




constitute the expected revenue maximizing mechanism.
A.2.1 A Counter-example
There are 2 bidders, i.e. N = 2. Both have valuations in the interval [0;1]
which are drawn i.i.d. with density f(v) = 2v; F(v) = v2. Both have a
common budget constraint b = 0:5. The Maskin solution would require us







i.e. ¹ v = 0:8177. Let us now pick ² ¿ 1, and iron [0;²]. It can be shown
that the budget constraint for type ¹ v is relaxed by ²3
6 . Therefore we can now
have the e±cient allocation for types [¹ v; ¹ v + ²) and still satisfy the budget
constraint. Further, one can show the expected loss of e±ciency from ironing
the interval [0;²] is O(²5), while the gain in e±ciency from unpooling the




Let f(:) be the density function for some distribution on <, and let F(:) be
the associated cumulative distibution function.
Lemma 6 If f(:) is (strictly) increasing on some interval [v1;v2], then for
any N > 1, we have:
(v2 ¡ v1)
































Note that both sides are equal (to zero) at v2 = v1. Therefore we have the
desired inequality if the derivative w.r.t v2 of the left hand side is greater
than the right hand side. Di®erentiating both sides w.r.t. v2 and rearranging


























The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 follow (almost trivially) from Proposition 3:2
of Border [5]. We reproduce it here (adapted to our notation):
Proposition 7 (Border) Let a : T ! [0;1] be the interim probability of
allocation for a type space T. For each ® 2 [0;1], set
E® = ft : a(t) ¸ ®g:










Lemma 1 follows since if a is monotonic, then the sets E® must be sets
of the form fv;v + 1;:::;mg.
Lemma 2 follows from Lemma 1; and the fact that if for some v, a(v) =
a(v¡1) = ®0; then E®0 = fv¡1;v;:::;mg. Further E® µ fv+1;v+2;:::;mg
if ® > ®0 while E® ¶ fv ¡ 2;v ¡ 1;:::mg if ® < ®0. Thus the inequality
corresponding to the set of types fv;v + 1;:::;mg can also be dropped by
Proposition 7. Equation (20) follows.
B.2 Cutoffs
This section provides a proof of Lemma 5. The Lemma states that in any
solution to (REVOPT), the cuto®s as de¯ned in De¯nition 1 are such that
vi ¸ ¹ vi ¡ 1 8i · k ¡ 1: (63)
As the intuition outlined in the main body points out, this result is not
surprising- if this condition is violated for some i, roughly speaking, decrease
the allocation of types (vi +1;bi+1) (and types pooled with it); and increase
the allocation of types f(¹ vi;bi);:::;(m;bi)g. This will clearly increase revenue
since the virtual valuation of the latter is ¹ vi > º(¹ vi) ¸ º(vi) which is the
virtual valuation of the former. The trouble is that this simple change can
violate the budget constraints.
Below we show how to perturb allocation rules not satisfying (63). The
construction relies critically on the assumption that the distribution over
types is such that valuation and budget are independent- the assumption
that all budgets are equally likely is however only for notational convenience.
Proof: Suppose not, i.e. suppose that allocation rule a solves (REVOPT),
with cuto®s ¹ V and V such that vi < ¹ vi ¡ 1 for some i.
To this end, let j ´ maxfi : vi < ¹ vi¡1g. Therefore vi ¸ ¹ vi¡1 for all i > j.
We show how to construct an allocation rule a0 is feasible in (REVOPT) that
45achieves weakly more revenue, such that v0
i ¸ ¹ v0
i ¡ 1 for all i > j ¡ 1.
For ease of notation assume that vj¡1 · vi and de¯ne ^ v ´ vj+1. Consider
the following perturbation of a¤:
1. Reduce the allocation of all types (^ v;bj+1);:::;(^ v;bk) by ² each.
2. Reduce the allocation of all types in f(v;b) : v > ^ v ;b ¸ bj+1g by
²=(^ v + 1) each.
3. Increase the allocation of type (^ v;bj) by (k ¡ j)².
4. Increase the allocation of types in f(v;bj) : v > ^ vg by (k ¡ j)²=(^ v + 1).
Firstly note that this perturbation is revenue neutral. Next we show that
the resulting allocation is feasible in the optimization program. Feasibility
with respect to the Border constraints is clear by construction. Next note
that the payment of type (v;b), v > ^ v, b > bj+1 changes by
¡v
²





^ v + 1
+ ² = 0:
Similarly the payment of type (v;bj), v > ^ v changes by
v
(k ¡ j)²





^ v + 1
+ (k ¡ j)² = 0:
Therefore the budget constraints for all types are still satis¯ed. Further, the
payment of type (^ v + 1;bj+1),
p
0(^ v + 1;bj+1) = p(^ v + 1;bj+1) (By Construction)
> bj (By de¯nition of ^ v)
¸ p
0(m;bj) (By budget constraint)
Finally, set ² such that
a(^ v;bj+1) ¡ ² = a(^ v;bj) + (k ¡ j)²;
.
46Let us assume that a0(^ v;bj) · a0(^ v + 1;bj). We show that a0 is incentive
compatible and individually rational. By Observation 2 it is enough to show
that a0 satis¯es (26- 31) (with v0
i = vi + 1).
Recall that a would have satis¯ed (26- 31). Verifying that (27- 31) are
satis¯ed with the new cuto® is straightforward. Inequality (26), i.e. that
a0(v;b) ¸ a0(v¡1;b) for all v;b, for b < bj follows from the fact that a(v;b) ¸
a(v ¡ 1;b). For b = bj, it follows from our assumption that a0(^ v;bj) ·
a0(^ v;bj). For b > bj we are done if a0(^ v;b) ¸ a0(^ v ¡ 1;b). But note that
a0(^ v;b) = a0(^ v;bj) ¸ a0(^ v ¡ 1;bj) = a0(^ v ¡ 1;b) ( here the ¯rst equality
follows from our choice of ², the second by construction, and the third since
a(^ v ¡ 1;b) = a0(^ v ¡ 1;b) for any b).
Now suppose instead that a0(^ v;bj) > a0(^ v+1;bj). In this case our pertur-
bation of a proceeds in two steps: the ¯rst step is the same as before with ²
such that
a(^ v;bj) + (k ¡ j)² = a(^ v + 1;bj) + (k ¡ j)
²
^ v + 1
:
Call the resulting allocation rule a00. Clearly, this perturbation will be rev-
enue neutral; and will satisfy (27- 30) with the same cuto®s as a. Further
a00(^ v;bj+1) > a00(^ v;bj) = a00(^ v + 1;bj). Next consider the following perturba-
tion of a00 :
1. Reduce the allocation of all types (^ v;bj+1);:::;(^ v;bk) by ² each.
2. Reduce the allocation of all types in f(v;b) : v > ^ v ;b ¸ bj+1g by
²=(^ v + 1) each.
3. Increase the allocation of type (^ v;bj) and (^ v + 1;bj) by (k ¡ j)²0.
4. Increase the allocation of types in f(v;bj) : v > ^ vg by (k ¡ j)²=(^ v + 1).
Pick ²;²0 to jointly solve:
²
0(f(^ v) + f(^ v)) = (k ¡ j)²f(^ v)
a
00(^ v;bj+1) ¡ ² = a
00(^ v;bj) + (k ¡ j)²
0
Denote the resulting allocation rule a0. By construction, a0 feasible with
respect to the Border conditions and (weakly) revenue increasing. Further,
given the decreasing density assumption; as long as a0(^ v+1;bj) · a0(^ v+2;bj),
47a0 will satisfy (26- 31) with cuto® v0
j = vj + 1. If a0(^ v + 1;bj) > a0(^ v + 2;bj),
this second perturbation will have to be analogously modi¯ed- it should be
clear how this can be done.
Note that this construction will increase vj, and (weakly) decrease ¹ vj.
Therefore it can be continued until vj ¸ ¹ vj ¡1, and therefore vi ¸ ¹ vi ¡1 for
all i > j ¡ 1. ¤
B.3 Subsidies
This section proves a technical result needed in the proof of Proposition 6
Observation 4 The function
Á(¼) =
(1 ¡ F(v ¡ 2))¼ + vf(v ¡ 1)(k¡i+1
k (1 ¡ F(v ¡ 1)) ¡ ¼)
k¡i+1
k vf(v ¡ 1) + ¼
is decreasing in ¼.
Proof: We are done if we can show that Á0(¼) · 0. Writing Á(¼) =
N(¼)
D(¼)
















=((1 ¡ F(v ¡ 2)) ¡ vf(v ¡ 1))
µ
k ¡ i + 1
k




(1 ¡ F(v ¡ 2))¼ + vf(v ¡ 1)
µ
k ¡ i + 1
k
(1 ¡ F(v ¡ 1)) ¡ ¼
¶¶
=((1 ¡ F(v ¡ 2)) ¡ vf(v ¡ 1))
µ





k ¡ i + 1
k
vf(v ¡ 1)(1 ¡ F(v ¡ 1))
=(¡(v ¡ 1)f(v ¡ 1))
¡k ¡ i + 1
k
vf(v ¡ 1)
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